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The Safe Logrank Test: Error Control under Optional
Stopping, Continuation and Prior Misspecification




We introduce the safe logrank test, a version of the logrank test that can retain
type-I error guarantees under optional stopping and continuation. It allows for effortless
combination of data from different trials while keeping type-I error guarantees, and can
be extended to define always-valid confidence intervals. The test is an instance of the
recently developed martingale tests based on e-values. We demonstrate the validity of the
underlying nonnegative martingale and show how to extend it to sequences of events with
ties and to Cox’ proportional hazards regression. Initial experiments show that the safe
logrank test performs well in terms of the maximal and the expected amount of events
needed to obtain a desired power.
1 Introduction
Traditional hypothesis tests and confidence intervals lose their validity under optional
stopping and continuation. Very recently, a new theory of testing and estimation has
emerged for which optional stopping and continuation pose no problem at all (Shafer
et al., 2011, Howard et al., 2021, Ramdas et al., 2020, Vovk and Wang, 2021, Shafer,
2020, Grünwald et al., 2019). The main ingredients are the e-value, a direct alternative
to the classical p-value, and the test martingale, a product of conditional E-variables.
These are used to create so-called safe tests that preserve type-I error control under
optional stopping and continuation, and always-valid confidence intervals that remain
valid irrespective of the stopping time employed. Pace and Salvan (2019) argue that
even without optional stopping, always-valid confidence intervals may be preferable over
standard ones.
Here we provide a concrete instance of this theory: we develop E-variables and mar-
tingales for a safe (under optional stopping) version of the classical logrank test of survival
analysis (Mantel, 1966, Peto and Peto, 1972) as well as for regression with Cox’s (1972)
proportional hazards model. At the time of writing, the former of these has already been
implemented in an R package (Ly and Turner, 2020). We provide some initial experi-
mental results in Section 5.
Logrank tests and proportional hazards are standard tools and assumptions in ran-
domized clinical trials, and are already often combined with group sequential/α-spending
approaches. Such approaches allow several interim looks at the data to stop for efficacy
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or futility. Like ours, they are rooted in early work by H. Robbins and his students
(Darling and Robbins, 1967, Lai, 1976), but the details are very different. The advantage
of using E-variables instead of α-spending is that the former is still more flexible, and
as a consequence easier to use. In particular, with group sequential approaches one has
to specify in advance at what points in time one is allowed to do an interim analysis;
α-spending is more flexible but still needs a maximum sample size to be set in advance.
With E-variables, one can always look and one can always add new data. This becomes
especially interesting if one wants to combine the results of several trials in a bottom-
up retrospective meta-analysis, where no top-down stopping rule can be enforced : if
a randomized clinical trial was reasonably successful but not 100% convincing, then a
second randomized trial might be performed because of this result— the trials are not
independent (Ter Schure and Grünwald, 2019). As a result of the second, a third might
be performed, and so on. Even if the alternative hypothesis in all these trials is different
(we may have, e.g. different effect sizes in different hospitals), as long as it is of interest
to reject a global null (no effect in any trial) we can simply combine all our E-variables
of individual trials by multiplication — the resulting test still has a valid type-I error
guarantee. Moreover, we can even combine interim results of trials by multiplication
while these trials are still ongoing — going significantly beyond the realm of traditional
α-spending approaches. We also show how E-variables can be combined with Bayesian
priors, leading to nonasymptotic frequentist type-I error control even if these priors are
wildly misspecified (i.e. they predict very different data from the data we actually ob-
serve). Our approach is sequential in nature, and thus to some extent related to earlier
sequential analyses such as Jones and Whitehead (1979) and Sellke and Siegmund (1983)
— although such analyses typically rely on using a precise stopping rule, whereas we al-
low arbitrary ones, and cannot be easily combined with prior distributions, whereas ours
can. One thing that we currently cannot provide for, is dealing with staggered entries of
single participants. All these features of our approach are highlighted in Example 1–5 in
Section 2, and we discuss staggered entries further in Section 7.
We refer to Grünwald et al. (2019) (GHK from now on) for an extensive introduction
to E-variables including their relation to likelihood ratios (when both the null hypothesis
H0 and the alternative H1 are simple (singleton), then the best E-variable coincides with
the likelihood ratio); Bayes factor hypothesis testing (E-variables are often, but not al-
ways, Bayes factors; and Bayes factors are often, but not always E-variables) and their
enlightening betting interpretation (indeed, e-values are also known under the name bet-
ting scores Shafer (2020)). The general story that emerges from papers such as Shafer’s
as well as GHK and Ramdas et al. (2020) is that E-variables and test martingales are the
‘right’ generalization of likelihood ratios to the case that both H0 and H1 can be com-
posite — of the many existing generalizations of likelihood to such cases, those that are
not E-variables will automatically show problematic behaviour in terms of error control,
and those that are can be combined freely over experiments while retaining type-I error
control, thereby providing an intuitive notion of evidence.
Contributions We show that Cox’ partial likelihood underlying his proportional haz-
ards model defines E-variables and test martingales. We first, in Section 2.2, show this
(a) for the case without covariates and without unordered simultaneous events (ties) ,
leading to a ‘safe’ (for optional stopping) logrank test. We then, (b), in Section 2.3, ex-
tend this to the case with ties, and (c), in Section 3, to the case with covariates. To keep
the story simple, we consider time discretized to arbitrary but finite precision, but for
completeness, in Section 6 we give a completely general proof, with continuous time, for
case (a). Case (a) and (b) vary on existing results and may not be so surprising to readers
familiar with martingale theory — though note that we work with nonnegative martin-
gales, which is different from most traditional uses of martingales in survival analysis.
They may be more surprised by case (c): with covariates, the partial likelihood ratio does
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not have a unique distribution under the null, and constructing an optimal E-variable
requires using the much less well-known concept of reverse information projection (RIPr)
(Li, 1999, Li and Barron, 2000, Grünwald et al., 2019).
Contents In the remainder of this introduction, we provide a short introduction to
E-variables and test martingales. In Section 2 we develop E-variables for proportional
hazards without covariates, based on Cox’ partial likelihood. Section 3 extends this to the
case with covariates. Section 4 provides some approximations that allow us to simplify the
analysis of the required sample size and the determination of E-variables that minimize
it, the use of priors (although the procedure uses approximations, type-I error control
remains exact) and the comparison to the classical logrank test. Section 5 provides some
simulations showing the feasibility of our approach in practice, if a minimum statistical
power is required. Section 6 gives a formal derivation that the Cox partial likelihood
without covariates forms a nonnegative martingale. All other proofs are delegated to the
appendix.
1.1 E-Variables and Test Martingales, Safety and Optimality
Definition 1 Let {Y〈i〉}i∈N0 represent a discrete-time random process and let H0, the
null hypothesis, be a collection of distributions for this process. Fix i > 0 and let S〈i〉
be a nonnegative random variable that is determined by (Y〈0〉, . . . , Y〈i〉), i.e. there exists
a function f such that S〈i〉 = f(Y〈0〉, . . . , Y〈i〉). We say that S〈i〉 is an E-variable
conditionally on Y〈0〉, . . . , Y〈i〉 if for all P ∈ H0,
EP [S〈i〉 | Y〈0〉, . . . , Y〈i− 1〉] ≤ 1. (1)
If (1) holds with equality, we call the E-variable sharp. If, for each i, S〈i〉 is an E-
variable conditional on Y〈0〉, . . . , Y〈i − 1〉, then we say that the product process {Si}i∈N
with Si =
∏i
k=1 S〈k〉 is a test supermartingale relative to {Y〈i〉}i∈N0 and the given H0.
If all constituent E-variables are sharp, we call the process a test martingale.
It is easy to see (Shafer et al., 2011) that a test (super-) martingale is, in more stan-
dard terminology, a nonnegative (super-) martingale relative to the filtration induced by
{Y〈i〉}i∈N0 , with starting value 1.
Safety The interest in E-variables and test martingales derives from the fact that we
haveT type-I error control irrespective of the stopping rule used: for any test (super-)
martingale {Si}i∈N relative to {Y〈i〉}i∈N0 and H0, Ville’s inequality (Shafer, 2020) tells
us that, for all 0 < α ≤ 1, P ∈ H0,
P (there exists i such that Si ≥ 1/α) ≤ α.
Thus, if we measure evidence against the null hypothesis after observing i data units by
Si, and we reject the null hypothesis if Si ≥ 1/α, then our type-I error will be bounded
by α, no matter what stopping rule we used for determining i. We thus have type-I error
control even if we use the most aggressive stopping rule compatible with this scenario,
where we stop at the first i at which Si ≥ 1/α (or we run out of data, or money to generate
new data). We also have type-I error control if the actual stopping rule is unknown to us,
or determined by external factors independent of the data Y〈i〉 — as long as the decision
whether to stop depends only on past data, and not on the future (the potential to take
into account external factors is not directly visible from Ville’s inequality as stated here;
it is formalized by GHK19).
We will call any test based on {Si}i∈N and a (potentially unknown) stopping time τ
that, after stopping, rejects iff Sτ ≥ 1/α a level α-test that is safe under optional stopping,
or simply a safe test.
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Importantly, we can also deal with optional continuation: we can combine E-variables
from different trials that share a common null (but may be defined relative to a different
alternative) by multiplication, and still retain type-I error control — see Example 4. If
we used p-values rather than E-variables we would have to resort to e.g. Fisher’s method,
which, in contrast to multiplication of e-values, is invalid if there is a dependency between
the (decision to perform) tests. E-variables and test martingales can also be used to define
‘always-valid confidence intervals’ that remain valid under optional stopping, as outlined
in Example 3.
Optimality Just like for p-values, the definition of E-variables only requires specifica-
tion of H0, not of an alternative hypothesis H1. H1 comes into play once we distinguish
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ E-variables: E-variables have been designed to remain small,
with high probability, under the null H0. But if H1 rather than H0 is true, then ‘good’ E-
variables should produce evidence (grow — because the larger the E-variable, the closer
we are to rejecting the null) against H0 as fast as possible. First consider a simple (single-
ton) H1 = {P}. If data comes from P , then the optimality of conditional E-variable S〈i〉
is measured in terms of EP [logS〈i〉 | Y〈0〉, . . . , Y〈i−1〉]. The E-variable which maximizes
this quantity among all E-variables is called Growth Rate Optimal in the Worst case,
GROW. There are various reasons why one should take a logarithm here — see GHK
and Shafer (2020) for details. We explore one in detail in Section 4.1: the GROW E-
variable which maximizes, among all E-variables, EP [logS〈i〉 | Y〈0〉, . . . , Y〈i− 1〉], is also
the E-variable which minimizes the expected number of data points needed before the
null can be rejected. Thus, finding a sequence of GROW E-variables is quite analogous
to finding the test that maximizes power — in Section 5 we provide some simulations to
relate power to GROW. Note that we cannot directly use power in designing tests, since
the notion of power requires a fixed sampling plan, which by design we do not have. In
case H1 is composite, we extend the notion of GROW to yield optimal growth in the
worst case: the GROW E-variable for outcome i conditional on Y〈0〉, . . . , Y〈i − 1〉, if it





EP [logS〈i〉 | Y〈0〉, . . . , Y〈i− 1〉], (2)
the maximum being over all E-variables conditional on Y〈0〉, . . . , Y〈i− 1〉.
2 Safe Logrank Tests
Preliminaries Throughout the text we abbreviate {1, . . . , n} to [n]. We assume that
n participants are included in a trial, with groups 1 (treatment) and 0 (control). We
let ~g = (g1, . . . , gn) be the binary vector indicating for each participant what group they
were put into.
In the general continuous time set-up, random variable Tj denotes the time at which
the event happens for participant j. All our results continue to hold under noninformative
right censoring. For simplicity, we will omit it from our analysis, except in the formal
treatment of Section 6.
We let Yj(t) = 1Tj≥t, be the ‘at risk’ process for the j-th participant, and let Y
g be
the number of participants at risk in the group g ∈ {0, 1} at time t, that is, Y g(t) =∑
j:~gj=g
Yj(t). We define ~Y (t) = (Y1(t), . . . , Yn(t)) to be the n-dimensional indicator
vector that indicates for each participant j whether the participant is still at risk at time
t. We set Ng[t′, t] = Y g(t′)−Y g(t) to be the number of events that happened in group g
inbetween time t′ and time t. We assume that a time increment of 1 represents a natural
‘unit time‘ for example an hour, a day, or a week.
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2.1 The Simplified Process in discrete time, without censoring
In any particular realization of the setting above, we will have a sequence of event times
t〈1〉 < t〈2〉 < t〈3〉 < . . . such that for all i, at time t〈i〉, one or more events happen,
and inbetween t〈i〉 and t〈i + 1〉, no events happen. We extend the notation to Ng〈i〉 to
denote the number of events happening in group g at the i th event time and ~Y〈i〉 =
(Y1〈i〉, . . . , Yn〈i〉) with Yj〈i〉 = 1 if Tj ≥ t〈i〉. Thus Yj〈0〉 = 1 for all j ∈ [n], Yj〈1〉 = 1
for all j ∈ [n] expect one, and so on, assuming no censoring: at the time of the first
event, everyone is at risk; at the time of the second event, everyone is at risk except
the participant that had the first event, etc. Again, ~Y〈i〉 is the n-dimensional vector that
indicates for each participant j whether they are still at risk, but now at the time that the
ith event happens. Let Y g〈i〉 be the number of participants at risk in the group g ∈ {0, 1}




Our method is best explained by first assuming that at each time t〈i〉, exactly one
event happens so N0〈i〉 + N1〈i〉 = 1, allowing us to abstract away from ’absolute’ time
scales. We can then define the simplified process ~Y〈0〉, ~Y〈1〉, . . . with each ~Y〈i〉 taking
values in {0, 1}n — note that this process is defined relative to a discrete sample space
[n]∞ in which there is no notion of continuous time. For given group assignment ~g and
each θ > 0 we define a distribution Pθ underlying this process such that:
1. ~Y〈0〉 = (1, 1, . . . , 1), Pθ-a.s.
2. For each i ≤ n, there is a single participant j◦ ∈ [n] that experiences an event, i.e.
we have Yj◦〈i〉 = 0, Yj◦〈i−1〉 = 1, and for all j ∈ [n] with j 6= j◦, Yj◦〈i〉 = Yj◦〈i−1〉.
We let J〈i〉 = j◦ be the RV denoting this participant.
3. We set
for j◦ with gj◦ = 1: Pθ(J〈i〉 = j◦ | Yj◦〈i− 1〉 = 1) :=
θ
Y 0〈i− 1〉+ Y 1〈i− 1〉θ
for j◦ with gj◦ = 0: Pθ(J〈i〉 = j◦ | Yj◦〈i− 1〉 = 1) =
1
Y 0〈i− 1〉+ Y 1〈i− 1〉 · θ
.
(3)
These requirements uniquely specify Pθ. In the next subsection we shall motivate the
definition (3) as giving essentially the correct conditional distribution of J〈i〉 under a
proportional hazards assumption with hazard ratio θ.
We define qθ to be the conditional probability mass function of the event that the i-th
event takes place in group g. That is:
qθ(g | (y0, y1)) := Pθ(Ng〈i〉 = 1 | Y 0〈i− 1〉 = y0, Y 1〈i− 1〉 = y1)
By the above,
qθ(1 | (y0, y1)) =
y1θ
y0 + y1θ




is the probability mass function of a Bernoulli y1θ/(y0 +y1θ)-distribution; note also that,
for any vector ~y that is compatible with the given y0, y1 and ~g, we have qθ(1 | (y0, y1)) =
Pθ(N
g〈i〉 = g | ~Y〈i− 1〉 = ~y): the probability of an event in group g only depends on the
counts in both groups. For given θ0, θ1 > 0, let
Mθ1,θ0〈0〉 = 1 ; Mθ1,θ0〈i〉 =
qθ1(N
1〈i〉 | Y 1〈i− 1〉, Y 0〈i− 1〉)
qθ0(N
1〈i〉 | Y 1〈i− 1〉, Y 0〈i− 1〉)
. (5)
By writing out the expectation, we see that
EPθ0
[





qθ1(g | Y 1〈i− 1〉, Y 0〈i− 1〉) = 1. (6)
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This standard argument immediately shows that, under Pθ0 , for all i, all θ1 > 0, Mθ1,θ0〈i〉








is a test martingale under Pθ0 relative to process {~Y }i∈N0 . Thus, by Ville’s inequality,
we have the highly desired:
P̃θ0
(






To give a first idea of its use in testing and estimation, we give several examples below,
simply acting as if Mθ1,θ0 would also be a test martingale under the unknown true dis-
tribution, even though the latter is defined on (continuous) time. We will show that this
is justified in Section 2.2 and 6.
Some of the examples require a generalization of Mθ1,θ0 in which qθ1 in (5) is replaced
by another conditional probability mass function ri(x | y1, y0) on x ∈ {0, 1}, allowed
to depend on i. For any given sequence of such conditional probability mass functions,
{ri}i∈N, we extend definition (5) to
Mr,θ0〈0〉 = 1 ; Mr,θ0〈i〉 =
ri(N
1〈i〉 | Y 1〈i− 1〉, Y 0〈i− 1〉)
qθ0(N
1〈i〉 | Y 1〈i− 1〉, Y 0〈i− 1〉)
. (9)
For any choice of the ri, (6) clearly still holds for the resulting Mr,θ0 , making Mr,θ0〈i〉 a
conditional E-variable and its product a martingale; and then Ville’s inequality (8) must
also still hold.
Example 1 [GROW alternative] The simplest possible scenario is that of a one-sided
test between ‘no effect’ (θ0 = 1) and a one-sided alternative hypothesis H1 = {Pθ1 :
θ1 ∈ Θ1} represented by For example, if ‘event’ means that the participant gets ill, then
we would hope that under the treatment, θ1 would be a value smaller than 1 and we
would have Θ1 = {θ : 0 < θ ≤ θ1}. If ‘event’ means ‘cured’ then we would typically set
Θ1 = {θ : θ̄1 ≤ θ <∞} for some θ̄1 > 1. We will take the left-sided alternative with θ < 1
as a running example, but everything we say in the remainder of this paper also holds
for the right-sided alternative. In the left-sided setting, setting, Mθ1,1〈i〉 is a conditional
E-variable for arbitrary θ1 > 0. More generally, Mr,1〈i〉 is a conditional E-variable for
arbitrary conditional mass functions ri. Still, the so-called GROW (growth-optimal in
worst-case) E-variable as in (2) is given by taking Mθ1,1, i.e. it takes the θ ∈ Θ0 closest





EPθ1 [logMθ,θ0〈i〉 | Y





EPθ1 [logMr,θ0〈i〉 | Y
1〈i− 1〉, Y 0〈i− 1〉]
is achieved by setting θ = θ, no matter the values taken by Y 1〈i − 1〉, Y 0〈i − 1〉. Here
the second maximum is over all sequences of conditional distributions ri as used in (9).
Thus, among all E-variables of the general form Mr,1〈i〉 there are very strong reasons
why setting ri = qθ is the best one can do — this is further elaborated in Section 4.1.
Nevertheless, if one does not restrict oneself to E-variables of the form Mθ1,θ0 , but uses
the more general Mr,θ0 instead, one may sometimes opt for another ‘almost’ GROW
choice, as elaborated in the next example.
Now suppose we want to do a two-sided test, with alternative hypothesis {Pθ1 : θ1 ≤
θ1 ∨ θ1 ≥ θ̄1} with θ̄1 > 1. For this case, one can create a new ‘combined GROW’
E-variable







verified to be a conditional E-variable by noting that EPθ0
[
Mθ1,θ0〈i〉 | Y 1〈i− 1〉, Y 0〈i− 1〉)
]
=
1; see GHK for details.
Example 2 [Tests based on Bayesian priors with Frequentist Type-I Error
Guarantees] Now suppose we do not have a very clear idea of which parameter θ1 ∈ Θ1 to
pick; we might thus want to put a prior probability distribution on Θ1. To accommodate
for this we extend our definition (4) to
qW (1 | y0, y1) =
∫
θ
qθ(1 | y0, y1)dW (θ)
for probability distributionsW on R. No matter whatW we pick, the resultingMW,θ0〈i〉 =
qW (1 | Y 1〈i− 1〉, Y 0〈i− 1〉)/qθ0(1 | Y 1〈i− 1〉, Y 0〈i− 1〉) is still an E-variable, as argued
above Example 1. If data come from some distribution with parameter θ1 ∈ Θ1, then
MW,θ0 will not be GROW unless W puts all of its mass on θ1; nevertheless, MW,θ0 can
come quite close to the optimal for a whole range of θ1 and may thus sometimes be
preferable over choosing Mθ1,θ0 — we illustrate this in Section 5.
Starting with a prior distribution W with density w, we can use Bayes theorem to
derive a posterior distribution wi(θ) on Θ1
wi(θ) := w(θ | Y 1〈0〉, Y 0〈0〉, . . . , Y 1〈i− 1〉, Y 0〈i− 1〉) =∏i−1
k=1 qθ(N




1〈k〉 | Y 1〈k − 1〉, Y 0〈k − 1〉)w(θ)dθ
.
We thus get:
qWi+1(1 | Y 1〈i〉, Y 0〈i〉) =
∫
θ
qθ(1 | Y 1〈i〉, Y 0〈i〉)wi+1(θ)dθ =∫
θ
qθ(1 | Y 1〈i〉, Y 0〈i〉) ·
∏i
k=1 qθ(N















1〈k〉 | Y 1〈k − 1〉, Y 0〈k − 1〉)w(θ)dθ∏i
k=1 qθ(N
1〈k〉 | Y 1〈k − 1〉, Y 0〈k − 1〉)
(11)
This approach resembles a Bayes-factor in the sense that it involves priors and subjective
choices. It is not Bayesian though in the important sense that our frequentist type-I
error guarantee continues to hold, irrespective of the prior we choose. Rather, there is
an element of what has been called luckiness in the machine learning theory literature
(Grünwald and Mehta, 2019): if the prior W turns out ‘correct’, in the weak sense that
the E-variable grows about as fast as we would expect in expectation over the prior, then
we get a strongly growing E-variable and will need few events need a larger sample. Yet,
the type-I error guarantee always holds, also in this ‘misspecified’ case.
Now, suppose we do have a minimum clinically relevant θ1 in mind, but we want to
exploit favorable situations in which the effect size is even larger than indicated by θ1, i.e.
the ‘true’ θ1 satisfies |θ − θ0| ≥ |θ1 − θ0| — these are ‘favorable’ because we can expect
the data to contain more evidence against the null. We may then choose to take a prior
that is (strongly) peaked at θ1, but stil places some mass on more extreme values of θ1.
Example 3 [Always-Valid Confidence Sequences] Standard tests give rise to confi-
dence intervals by varying the null and ‘inverting’ the corresponding tests. In analogous
fashion, test martingales can be used to derive always-valid (AV) confidence sequences
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(Darling and Robbins, 1967, Lai, 1976, Howard et al., 2018a,b). In our setting, a (1−α)-
AV confidence sequence is a sequence of confidence intervals {cii}i∈N, one for each con-
secutive event, such that
Pθ (there is an i ∈ N with θ 6∈ cii) ≤ α. (12)
(see Example 4 for why we write i ∈ N rather than i ∈ {1, . . . , Y 0〈0〉 + Y 1〈1〉}). A
standard way to design (1−α)- AV confidence sequences is to start with a prior W on θ1
and report, after observing i events, cii,α = [θi,L, θi,U ] where θi,L is the largest θ0 such
that for all θ′ ≤ θ0, MW,θ′〈i〉 ≥ 1/α; similarly θi,U is the smallest θ0 such that for all
θ′ ≥ θ0, MW,θ′〈i〉 ≥ 1/α. That is, we check (11) where we vary θ0 and we report the
smallest interval such that MW,θ0 > 1/α outside this interval.
This will give an AV confidence sequence for arbitrary priors W — in fact it will still
do so if we make the prior W a function of θ′, but for simplicity we will not go into that
option here.
We stress again that the AV confidence sequences give frequentist confidence intervals
that are valid irrespective of our choice of prior W — and indeed they are different from
Bayesian posterior credible intervals. The effect of the prior is that if we are ‘lucky’
and the data match the prior well, then the confidence intervals we end up with will be
narrower than if the data contradict the prior.
Example 4 [Several Trials, Ad Lib Optional Continuation] What if we want to
combine several trials, conducted in different hospitals or in different countries? In such
a case we often compare a ‘global’ null — H0 is true in all trials — to an alternative that
allows for different hazard ratios in different trials, with different populations. We may
thus associate the k-th trial with E-variable Mθ1,k,θ0 , with θ1,k varying from trial to trial
— or, as in Example 2, we might use priors on θ1 in each trial.
Suppose then that there are several trials numbered k = 1, 2, . . . and we observe
subsequent events numbered m = 1, 2, . . . where k(m) denotes the trial the m-th event
is part of, and i(k,m) is the number of events seen so far (i.e. after seeing m events in




k 〈i〉 | Y 1k 〈i− 1〉, Y 0k 〈i− 1〉)
qθ0(N
1
k 〈i〉 | Y 1k 〈i− 1〉, Y 0k 〈i− 1〉)
denote the E-variable corresponding to the i-th event in the k-th trial, with Y gk 〈i〉 denoting
the number of people at risk in group g in trial k after i events. The evidence against H0





As GHK explain, in such cases the always-valid type-I error guarantee still holds:
under the null, the probability that there ever comes a sequence of s events such that
Msmeta ≥ 1/α, is still bounded by α. Thus, we effectively perform an ‘on-line meta-
analysis’ here that remains valid irrespective of the order in which the events of the
different trials come in.
Importantly, unlike in α-spending approaches, the maximum number of trials and the
maximum sample size (number of events) per trial do not have to be fixed in advance;
one may always decide to start a new trial, or to postpone ending a trial and wait for
new data.
Example 5 [Pseudo-Staggered Entries] Consider the common case with just a single
trial, in which some of the participants enter the study at a later date — as long as
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whenever they enter, there is always at least one participant that enters into both groups,
we can treat this scenario as a very special case of the previous one: it is as if one would
start a new trial, with the same θ1, but a new cohort of participants; one can simply
combine all results pertaining to this ‘new’ trial with those of the previous results by
multiplying the respective E-variables, again preserving type-I error guarantees. In this
approach we essentially stratify the risk set by early and late entry.
A different scenario occurs when a single participant may enter at a later time. An
asymptotic analysis of staggered entries in a sequential setting is given by Sellke and
Siegmund (1983); extending it to our nonasymptotic treatment is a goal for future work
— see Section 7.
2.2 Linking to Proportional Hazards without Covariates
We now consider a richer setting in which event time can be explicitly represented, yet
we still discretize it to a very small (but unknown) ε, with ε  1 (so every time unit
contains many discretized time points, each representing an interval). We will show within
this setting, that if the data really come from a random process satisfying proportional
hazards, i.e. for some θ > 0, for all t ≥ 0, λ(1)(t)/λ(0)(t) = θ where λ(g) is the hazard rate




will truly behave like a test martingale. In Section 3 we extend this argument
to Cox’ proportional hazards model with covariates.
Thus, we now denote by P[ε],. a distribution for the ε-increment discrete-time random
process {~Y (k · ε)}k=0,1,2,.... All random elements occurring inside the argument of P[ε],θ
are defined relative to this ε-increment process. Thus, while we write P[ε],θ(N
g〈i〉 = 1 |
~Y〈i− 1〉 = ~y) below it would be more correct to write P[ε],θ(Ng[ε]〈i〉 = 1 | ~Y[ε]〈i− 1〉 = ~y)
since the definition of random variables Ng[ε]〈i〉 and ~Y[ε]〈i − 1〉 depends on ε; but we will
generally omit this dependency in the notation.
We will generally assume that the hazard functions are Lipschitz continuous and
bounded away from 0 and ∞ in t, i.e. there exists some (unknown) constants 0 < c <
C <∞ such that for all t ≥ 0, g ∈ {0, 1}, c < λ(g)(t) < C.
We say that a distribution P[ε] for random process {~Y (k · ε)}k=0,1,2,... as above is
compatible with hazard functions {λj : j = 1, . . . , n} (assumed Lipschitz continuous and
bounded as above) if for all j ∈ [n], we have P[ε](Yj(0) = 1) = 1 and, under P[ε] the
event times T1, T2, . . . , Tn are i.i.d. random variables with support N and with marginal
distribution satisfying, for j ∈ [n],
min
(k−1)ε≤t<kε
λj(t)ε ≤ P[ε](Tj < kε | (k − 1)ε ≤ Tj) ≤ max
(k−1)ε≤t<kε
λj(t)ε. (13)
We say that P[ε] is compatible with proportional hazards ratio θ and group assignment
~g, if it is compatible with hazard functions {λj : j = 1, . . . , n} and there exist functions
λ(1), λ(0), again assumed Lipschitz continuous and bounded away from 0 and infinity,
with, for all t, λ(0)(t)/λ(1)(t) = θ such that, for all j in the control group (gj = 0) we
have λj = λ(0) and for all j in the treatment group (gj = 1) we have λj = λ(1).
We call a tuple (i, ~y, y0, y1) compatible with i event times if it can arise in the process
of unfolding events, and the total number of event times is at least i; that is, if i ∈ [n], y0
is the number of 0s in ~y, y1 is the number of 1s in ~y ∈ {0, 1}n, and y0 + y1 = n if i = 1
and 0 < y0 + y1 ≤ n − (i − 1) if i > 1. By only requiring an inequality rather than an
equality in the latter equation, we thus do allow for more than one event to happen at
any time t〈i〉 at which an event happens, but the result below implies that the probability
that at the i-th event time there will be more than 1 event goes to 0 with ε.
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Theorem 1 Fix θ > 0, and let, for all ε > 0, P[ε],θ be a distribution compatible with pro-
portional hazards ratio θ. Let t〈i〉, Ng〈i〉, ~Y〈i〉 be defined as in the beginning of Section 2.1.
For g ∈ {0, 1}, for all (i, ~y, y0, y1) compatible with i event times, we have:
qθ(g | (y0, y1)) = lim
ε↓0
P[ε],θ(N




g〈i〉 = 1 | Y 0〈i− 1〉 = y0, Y 1〈i− 1〉 = y1)
where qθ(· | (y0, y1)) is as in (4), y1 is the number of 1s in ~y, and y0 is the number of
0s. Moreover, the limits holds uniformly, e.g. for the second statement we really have
limε↓0 sup |qθ(g | (y0, y1)) − P[ε],θ(Ng〈i〉 = 1 | Y 0〈i − 1〉 = y0, Y 1〈i − 1〉 = y1)| = 0 with
the supremum over g ∈ {0, 1} and all tuples compatible with i event times.
Theorem 1 is a reformulation of existing results that underlie the standard interpretation
of qθ as a partial likelihood. The particular form we show here implies that, in the limit as
ε ↓ 0, for all θ0, θ1 > 0, EP[ε],θ0 [Mθ1,θ0〈i〉 |
~Y〈i−1〉 = ~y] ≤ 1, so that, as long as we consider




like a test martingale, allowing for optional stopping and continuation. In Section 6 we
show, using more difficult arguments, that it really is a nonnegative martingale if we
consider continuous time directly.
2.3 Linking to Proportional Hazards without covariates, II: when
ties are possible
In practice, we often observe the data at regular time intervals, which we may identify
with unit time. Thus, at time t = 1, 2, . . . we observe that, between time t − 1 and t,
there have been Ng[t − 1, t] events in group g where Ng[t − 1, t] can be 0, 1, but also
more than 1. In the latter case, we usually do not observe the order in which the specific
events took place. We cannot represent this common situation with our previous limiting
process Pθ, which requires a fully observable ordering of events. Luckily, we can define a
version of a conditional distribution Pθ which is still well-defined in this situation, which
is still a limit of P[ε],θ as defined above, and which again leads to a likelihood ratio that
forms a test martingale under the null.
We consider the discrete-time random process as above, with small time steps ε, where
we now assume that ε = 1/m, where m is some large integer. We choose ε of this form to
ensure that our unit time is an integer multiple of an ε-time interval. We first derive the
relevant probability mass function, which is the analogue of qθ(g|(y0, y1)): fix an integer
s (this will represent the number of events that happen in a given unit time interval) and
let, for v = 0, 1, . . . , s,






















. with vmin = max{0, s−y0}; vmax = min{s, y1},
(14)
be the probability mass function of a Fisher noncentral hypergeometric distribution with
parameters (N [t− 1, t], Y 1(t− 1), Y 0(t− 1) + Y1(t− 1), θ) = (s, y1, y0 + y1, θ).
We call a tuple (s, ~y, y0, y1) internally compatible if it can arise in the process of
unfolding events; that is, if y0 is the number of 0s in ~y, y1 is the number of 1s in
~y ∈ {0, 1}n, and if s ≤ y0 + y1 = n.
Theorem 2 Let P[ε],θ be a distribution compatible with proportional hazards as defined
above. Let N[K − 1,K] := N1[K − 1,K] + N0[K − 1,K]. We have for all m ∈ N, all






1[K−1,K] = v | N[K−1,K] = s, ~Y (K−1) = ~y) = rθ(v | (y0, y1), s).
(15)
The same statement holds if we replace the condition ~Y (K − 1) = ~y by Y 0(K − 1) =
y0;Y 1(K − 1) = y1).
Thus, if the data come from a process satisfying proportional hazards with rate θ, then
to all intents and purposes we may act as if the number of events in group 1 in a given
time unit, and given a certain number of events happening in the same time unit is
hypergeometric.
As our new analogue of the E-variable Mθ1,θ0 , we now define, for given θ0, θ1 > 0 and







U(k) , Uθ1,θ0(k) :=
{
1 if N [k − 1, k] = 0
rθ1 (N
1[k−1,k]|Y 0(k−1),Y 1(k−1),N [k−1,k])
rθ0 (N
1[k−1,k]|Y 0(k−1),Y 1(k−1),N [k−1,k]) if N [k − 1, k] > 0.
(16)




~Y (k − 1)] = 1.
Thus, in the limit for almost continuous time, Uθ1θ0(k) becomes an E-variable conditional




being ‘essentially’ a test martingale; if the true process satisfies proportional
hazards with rate θ0, the type-I error of testing based on U
(k)
θ1,θ0
is preserved under optional
stopping.
We note that, unlike Mθ1,θ0 , Uθ1,θ0 cannot, or at least not easily, be thought of as
a likelihood under any fully defined distribution for the process {~Y (kε)}k=0,1,2...; it is
simply set to 1 at times at which no event happens, whereas any ratio of ‘real’ underlying
likelihoods would presumably not be 1 at all those times. But this is not a problem: for
the test martingale interpretation, we merely need E-variables, a more general concept
than likelihoods.
Compatibility between Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 Reassuringly, if at all
times k = 1, 2, . . . ,K we observed at most one event to happen inbetween time k − 1
and k, then the evidence as measured by M and the evidence as measured by U can be
reconciled. To see this, let N(k) be the number of events that have happened up until
time k. Then if at all times k = 1, 2, . . . ,K we observed at most one event to happen
inbetween time k − 1 and k, we have U (k) = M 〈N(k)〉: the two processes only start to
disagree once there has been a unit of time in which more than one event happpened. To
see that U (k) = M 〈N(k)〉, note that, plugging in v = 1, s = 1 into (14), for y0, y1 > 1, we
get:
























y0 + y1 · θ
,
which is the same as for the qθ we used in the definition of the process {M 〈i〉}; we can
do an analogous derivation with v = 0, s = 1. Thus, both processes coincide as long as
we never observe more than 1 event per time unit.
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Odds vs Hazard Ratios The standard interpretation of the parameter θ in a hy-
pergeometric distribution is as an odds ratio, i.e. a quantity of the form (p1/p0) · (1 −
p0)/(1− p1). At first sight it might seem strange that in this theorem, it takes the form
θ = λ(1)/λ(0). What happened to the 1 − λ(g)’s? This is readily explained by checking
the proof: at discretization level ε, P[ε],θ is really approximated by a hypergeometric with
parameter (λ(1)ε/λ(0)ε) · (1−λ(0)ε)/(1−λ(1)ε). Taking the limit ε ↓ 0 the 1−λ(g) factors
disappear.
3 Covariates: the Cox Proportional Hazard E-Variable
Fix a set of d covariates and let Z = (~z1 . . . ~zn) be the matrix consisting of the covariate
vectors for each participant: ~zj = (zj,1, . . . , zj,d). Just like the group assigment ~g, we
assume Z to be fixed (hence the covariates do not change in time), all probability measures
being conditioned on its values, so that we can omit it from our notation. As in the case
without covariates, we first consider the simplified process without continuous time of
Section 2.1. The distribution underlying this process is now denoted Pβ,θ with θ > 0
and β ∈ Rd. As before, this process is defined to satisfy the first two requirements of
Section 2.1, but the third requirement now becomes: Pβ,θ is given by, for j ∈ [n] and
~y ∈ {0, 1}n with ~yj = 1:






with θ′ = log θ, consistent with Cox’ (1972) proportional hazards regression model: the
probability that the j-th participant has an event, assuming he/she is still at risk, is
proportional to the exponentiated weighted covariates, with group membership being one
of the covariates. In case β = 0, this is easily seen to coincide with the definition of Pθ
via (4).
We can link the new process to a more realistic process with almost-continuous time
just as in Section 2.2: we let P[ε],β,θ be a distribution for the random process as in
that section, and we say that P[ε] is compatible with the d-dimensional Cox proportional
hazards model with parameters β ∈ Rd and θ ∈ R, group assignment ~g and covariates Z,
if it is compatible with hazard functions {λj : j = 1, . . . , n} as in (13) and these functions
satisfy for a function λbase that is Lipschitz continuous and bounded away from 0 and
infinity: for all t,
λj(t)
λbase(t)
= exp(βT~zj + θgj).
In any realization of the process, events will happen at times t1, t2, . . .. Let J〈i〉 denote
the set of participants with Tj = ti, i.e. they suffer an event at the i-th event time. If
we consider sufficiently small time scales, then the probability that more than one event
happens at any even time goes to 0, and we get:
Theorem 3 Let P[ε],β,θ a distribution compatible with Cox’ proportional hazards model
as above. For all ~g ∈ {0, 1}n, all Z ∈ Rn·d, all i ∈ N and ~y ∈ {0, 1}n with yj = 1,
|~y| ≤ n− (i− 1), we have:
qβ,θ(j | ~y) = lim
ε↓0
P[ε],θ(J〈i〉 = {j} | ~Y〈i− 1〉 = ~y).
The proof of this result is entirely analogous to the proof of Theorem 1 and is omitted
from the text.
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3.1 E-Variables and Martingales
Let W be a prior distribution on β ∈ Rd for some d > 0. (W may be degenerate, i.e. put
mass one in a specific parameter vector β1). We let
qW,θ(j | ~y) =
∫
qβ,θ(j | ~y)dW (β).
Consider a measure ρ on Rk (e.g. Lebesgue or some counting measure) and we let W be
the set of all distributions on Rk which have a density relative to ρ, and W◦ ⊂ W be any
convex subset of W (we may take W◦ =W, for example). We define q̃←W,θ0(· | ~y) to be
the reverse information projection (Li, 1999) (RIPr) of qW,θ(j | ~y) on {qW,θ0 : W ∈ W◦}
such that
D(qW,θ1(· | ~y)‖q̃←W,θ0(· | ~y)) = inf
W ′∈W◦
D(qW,θ1(· | ~y)‖qW ′,θ0(· | ~y)).
We know from Li (1999), Grünwald et al. (2019) that q̃←W,0(· | ~y) exists. As explained in
the context of E-variables for 2×2 contingency tables, the fact that the random variables
Y〈i〉 constituting our random process have finite range implies that, for each W , the
infimum is in fact achieved by some distribution W ′ with finite support on Rd.
For given θ0, θ1 > 0, let
MW,θ1,θ0〈i〉 =
qW,θ1(N
1〈i〉 | ~Y〈i− 1〉)
q←W,θ0(N
1〈i〉 | ~Y〈i− 1〉)
(17)
be our analogue of Mθ1,θ0〈i〉 as in (5).
Theorem 4 [Corollary of Theorem 1 from GHK19] For every prior W on Rk, for
all β̃ ∈ Rd, Eβ̃,θ0 [MW,θ1,θ0〈i〉 | ~Y〈i− 1〉)] is an E-variable.
Note that the result does not require the prior W to be well-specified in any-way: under
any (β̃, θ0) in the null distribution, even if β̃ is completely disconnected to W , MW,θ1,θ0
is an E-variable.
How to find the RIPr While in general, it is not clear how to calculate the RIPr
q←W,θ0 , Li (1999), Li and Barron (2000) have designed an efficient algorithm for approx-
imating it, which is feasable as long as we restrict W◦ to be the set of all priors W for
which, for all j ∈ [n], QW,θ0(J〈i〉 = j | ~Yj〈i−1〉 = 1) ≥ δ, for ` = 1, . . . , k, for some δ > 0.
The algorithm achieves an approximation error of O((log(1/δ))/M) if run for M steps,
where each step takes time linear in d. Since the factor is logarithmic in 1/δ, we can
take a very small value of δ and then the requirement does not seem overly restrictive.
Exploring whether the Li-Barron algorithm really allows us to compute the RIPr for the
Cox model, and hence MW,θ1,θ0 in practice, is a major goal for future work.
When ordering of events is lost While in the case without covariates, our E-
variables allowing for ties (several events at a time with unknown ordering) correspond
to a likelihood ratio of noncentral hypergeometrics, the situation is not so simple if there
are covariates — although deriving the appropriate extension of the noncentral hyperge-
ometric partial likelihood is possible, one ends up with a hard-to-calculate formula (Peto,
1972). Various approximations have been proposed in the literature (Cox, 1972, Peto,
1972, Efron, 1974). In case these preserve the E-variable and martingale properties, they
would retain type-I error probabilities under optional stopping and we could use them
without problems. We do not know whether this is the case however; for the time being,
we recommend handling ties by putting the events in a worst-case order, leading to the
smallest values of the E-variable of interest, as this is bound to preserve the type-I error
guarantees.
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4 Important Approximations: Stopping Time, Bayes
Predictive, Normal Likelihood
Below we present three approximate calculations that are relevant for practice. In all
three cases we restrict these to the simple setting of Section 2, one-event-at-a-time and
no covariates. All three require the same informally stated Basic Condition: for both
g ∈ {0, 1}, Y g〈0〉 is ‘large’ compared to the maximum number of events we will ever see.
Under this condition, the ratio between the number of people at risk in both groups
remains approximately constant throughout the trial, so that, as a first approximation,
we may approximate, for all i until the end of the trial, qθ(N
1〈i〉 | Y 1〈i − 1〉, Y 0〈i − 1〉)
by qθ(N
1〈i〉 | Y 1〈0〉, Y 0〈0〉). Thus, in our calculations we will replace Pθ(Ng〈i〉 = 1 |
Y 0〈i− 1〉 = y0, Y 1〈i− 1〉 = y1), defined in terms of q as in (4), by
P ′θ(N
1〈i〉 = 1 | Y 0〈i− 1〉 = y0, Y 1〈i− 1〉 = y1) := qθ(N1〈i〉 | Y 1〈0〉, Y 0〈0〉), (18)
which replaces the counts at time i− 1 by the counts at time 0. Thus, we treat the data
as if it were i.i.d. Bernoulli , greatly facilitating the analysis. This Basic Condition could,
for example, hold because the number of events needed to get a significant result or to
stop because of futility is much smaller than the number of people at risk; or it could hold
because the study will be stopped long before the number of events gets large — to give a
practical example, in the ongoing Covid-19 vaccine trials, the number of people included
in each trial is in the 10000s, whereas the number of events one expects to happen is in
the low 100s.
4.1 Expected Stopping Time and the GROW Criterion
Let Pθ0 represent our null model, and let, as before, the alternative model be given as
H1 = {Pθ1 : θ ∈ Θ} with Θ = {θ1 : 0 < θ1 ≤ θ1} for some θ1 < 1. Suppose we perform
a level α test based on a test martingale Mθ,θ0 using the aggressive stopping rule: stop
as soon as Mθ,θ0 ≥ 1/α. The GROW criterion (Section 1.1, Example 1) tells us to use
θ = θ1. Here we motivate this GROW criterion by showing that it minimizes, in a worst-
case sense, the expected number of events needed before there is sufficient evidence to
stop. The calculation below ignores the practical need to prepare for a bounded maximum
number of events and the relation to classical statistical power. For such more complicated
considerations, we need to resort to simulations as in the next section.
Recall our Basic Condition: allowing us to act as if the distribution of Y 1〈1〉, Y 2〈2〉, . . .
are given by (18). This makes the random variables N1〈i〉 i.i.d. Bernoulli, enabling
a standard argument based on Wald’s (1952) identity. As said, we stop as soon as
M := Mθ,θ0 ≥ 1/α or when we run out of data, leading to a stopping time τθ. Suppose









For simplicity we will further assume that the number of people at risk is large enough
compared to θ1 so that the probability that we run out of data before we can reject is



















with very small between 0 and log |θ/θ0|, and p′θ(N1〈1〉) = qθ(N1〈1〉 | Y 1〈0〉, Y 0〈0〉).
The first equality is just definition, the second follows because we reject as soon as
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Mθ,θ0 ≥ 1/α, so Mθ,θ0〈τθ〉 can’t be smaller than 1/α, and it can’t be larger by more
than a factor equal to the maximum likelihood ratio at a single outcome (if we would
not ignore the probability of stopping because we run out of data, there would be an
additional small term in the numerator).
If we try to find the θ which minimizes this, and — as is customary in sequential
analysis — we approximate the minimum by ignoring the very small part, we see that
the expression is minimized by maximizing EP ′θ1
[log pθ(Y〈1〉)pθ0 (Y〈1〉)
] over θ. The maximum is
clearly achieved by θ = θ1; the expression in the denominator then becomes the KL
divergence between two Bernoulli distributions. It follows that under θ1, the expected
number of outcomes until rejection is minimized if we set θ = θ1. Thus, we use the
GROW E-variable relative to {θ1} as our actual E-variable. We still need to consider
the case that, since the real H1 is ‘composite’, as statisticians, we do not know the actual






















But this just tells us to use the GROW E-variable relative to H1, which is what we were
arguing for.
4.2 Using Bayes predictive distributions for the alternative
Calculating MW,θ0〈i〉 as in Example 2 and 3 amounts to calculating a Bayes predictive
distribution involving an integral which is hard to evaluate for large i (at least, we did
not find a prior W for which calculation is easy). One may of course approximate these
predictive distributions by Gibbs sampling, but another rough-and-ready option is as
follows: as in (9), let {ri}i∈N denote an arbitrary sequence of probability mass functions
on {0, 1} conditioned on integers (y0, y1). By the reasoning underneath (9), Mr,θ0〈i〉 also
gives a conditional E-variable and its product over time gives a test martingale — we
simply replaced qθ1 by a sequence of distributions that possibly lie outside our model.
Suppose we have a minimum clinically relevant θ1 in mind and we ideally would like
to use qW with W a prior peaked at θ1. Directly calculating MW,θ0 is not straightforward,










0θ1). This is the probability of the first event falling in
group 1 according to θ1. We now take Vm to be a beta-distribution with density vm on
Bernoulli parameter µ ∈ [0, 1] that peaks at p1: vm(µ) ∝ µmp1(1− µ)m(1−p1); the larger
the value of m, the sharper the peak around p1. We now set ri to be the Bayes predictive
distribution after observing N1〈1〉, . . . , N1〈i−1〉, based on prior Vm. Analogously to (10):
ri+1(1 | Y 1〈i〉, Y 0〈i〉) =
∫
µ






We can easily turn this into an always-valid confidence sequence, replacing MW,θ′ in the
definition below (12) by Mr,θ′ based on ri as in (20). We stress that the use of ri instead
of qW does not compromise on safety: type-I errors and confidence sequences based on
Mρ,θ′ remain valid.
4.3 Comparison to Normal Likelihood for the Logrank Statistic
The traditional, nonsequential treatment of the logrank test considers data of a fixed
sample size and analyzes the logrank statistic at that sample size. Schoenfeld (1981)
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shows that, under the null, this statistic is asymptotically normally distributed (which
was essentially already stated by Cox (1972)), and can be used to perform fixed-sample
size power analyses. This raises the question whether our E-variable Mθ1,θ0〈i〉 can also be
related to a likelihood ratio between normal densities defined on a ‘local’ logrank statistic
(not for the full sample, but just for the i-th event). A priori it is not at all clear whether
Schoenfeld’s asymptotic, fixed sample result has a nonasymptotic sequential counterpart,
but it turns out that for hazard ratios close to 1 (also noted by Cox (1972)) and at sample
sizes with total number of events much smaller than the number of participants at risk
in either group, there is a strong correspondence after all.
Thus, we are looking to check if
Mθ1,θ0〈i〉 =
qθ1(N
1〈i〉 | Y 1〈i− 1〉, Y 0〈i− 1〉)
qθ0(N
1〈i〉 | Y 1〈i− 1〉, Y 0〈i− 1〉)
≈
qθ1(N
1〈i〉 | Y 1〈0〉, Y 0〈0〉)
qθ0(N
1〈i〉 | Y 1〈0〉, Y 0〈0〉)




for some µ1 and µ0 to be determined below as functions of θ1 and θ0, where φµ,σ is the
density of a normally distributed RV with mean µ and variance σ2. Here the ≈ equality
is already justified by our Basic Condition, and we will now check wither the latter two
quantities are close as well under this condition. Z(i) is defined as the standard logrank
statistic that would be observed based only on the i-th event:
Z〈i〉 = N
1〈i〉 − P 1〈i〉√
P 1〈i〉 · P 0〈i〉
with N1〈i〉 ∈ {0, 1},
and P g〈i〉 = Y g〈i − 1〉/(Y 0〈i − 1〉 + Y 1〈i − 1〉) the fraction of people at risk in group g
when the i-th event happens.
Now, Schoenfeld (1981) shows that asymptotically, the distribution of the logrank
statistic based on all events so far,
Z̄〈1 : i〉 :=
∑i
k=1(N
1〈k〉 − P 1〈k〉)√∑i
k=1 P
1〈k〉 · P 0〈k〉
(22)
converges to a normal with variance 1 and mean given by
√
P 1〈0〉P 0〈0〉i′ log θ where i′
is approximately equal to the number of events i. Now under our Basic Condition that
the number of people at risk in both groups is a lot larger than the number of events




k=1 Z〈k〉. This suggests (but
does not prove) that Z〈i〉 itself can be approximated by a normal distribution with mean√
P 1〈0〉P 0〈0〉 log θ. We will thus take the µg in (21) to be
√
P 1〈0〉P 0〈0〉 log θg.
Now, simulations show that with this choice, Mµ1,µ0 in (21) gets extremely close to
Mθ1,θ0 as long as θ1 is close to 1 and the number of people at risk in both groups is much
larger than number of events. In Figure 1 we plot Mθ1,1〈i〉/M ′µ1,0〈i〉 as a function of log θ1
(the plots are identical for the case that the i-th event is in group 1 and the case that
it is in group 0, and are identical for different i, as long as the number of people at risk
in both groups is the same). For example, suppose we test a hazard ratio of θ1 = 0.8,
corresponding to a Schoenfeld mean of µ1 = −0.11 against θ0 = 1 (µ0 = 0). At this level
the approximation is extremely tight: the ratio of the Bernoulli and normal likelihood
ratios is 1.000013. If we consider hazard ratio θ1 = 0.5, we get a ratio of 1.001. This is
small, but may not be completely negligible any more — if we have a 1000 events, the
joint likelihood ratio can be expected to be off by a factor of about (1+ .001)1000 ≈ exp(1)
— at least, because also the ratio between the number of persons at risks would change
in a real experiment. Note that as the hazard ratio moves further away from 1, the error
made by the normal approximation per event can become quite large after all — on the
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Figure 1: Schoenfeld Normal vs Bernoulli
other hand, less events are needed to reject the null. In the next section we shall see that
therefore, in practice, the Gaussian approximation of the likelihood works quite well, even
for moderately extreme θ as long as we aim for power that is not too high (say 0.8).
5 Some Simulations
In this section we investigate by simulation the results and the discussion from the pre-
vious sections.
Recall from our discussion in Section 2.1 that the process Mθ1,θ0 does not depend on
the event times themselves, but only on their ranks: in which order the events happened
in each group. Furthermore, Theorem 1 allows us to simulate efficiently the order in which
the events of the survival process happen. Indeed, if we are testing some fixed θ1 with
θ1 ≤ 1 against θ0 = 1, and we have witnessed k events, the odds of next event happening
in group 1 are θ1Y
1〈k〉 : Y 0〈k〉 under the alternative hypothesis. Thus, simulating in
which group the next event happens only takes a (biased) coin flip.
We limit our attention in this section to the aforementioned one-sided testing scenario
θ1 (for some θ1 ∈ (0, 1)) vs. θ0 = 1, and we fix our desired level to α = 0.05. As in Section
4.1, we consider the stopping rule τθ1 = inf{i : M
〈i〉
θ1,1
≥ 1/α}, that is, we stop as soon as
our test martingale crosses the threshold 1/α. We interpret the infimum of an empty set
to be ∞, so that τθ1 = ∞ if the threshold is never crossed. By our previous discussion,
we have a type-I error guarantee for this and any other stopping rule. However τθ1,1 may
often be too large: it may not be feasible financially or time-wise to wait either until
the stopping moment or until we run out of patients to reach a decision. Thus it seems
reasonable to determine a number of events imax after which we stop anyway, and decide
to accept the null, even if our test martingale M
〈i〉
θ1,1
may have crossed the threshold 1/α,
had we continued the study. We would like to control the probability β of this type-II
error, induced by stopping at τθ1 ∧ imax instead of stopping at τθ1 . A moment’s thought
shows that we look for the smallest imax such that
Pθ1(τθ1 ≥ imax) ≤ 1− β
for a target power 1− β, which we fix to 0.8. Of course imax is just the (1− β)-quantile
of τθ1 , and can be estimated experimentally in a straightforward manner. We simulate
a number of realizations isim of τθ1 and use the (1 − β)-quantile of the observed em-
pirical distribution of τθ1 . For each configuration θ1, Y
1〈0〉, Y 0〈0〉 that we considered,
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we performed msim = 10000 simulations and assessed the uncertainty in the estimate of
imax by estimating its standard deviation using 1000 bootstrap rounds on the empirical
distribution of τθ1 .
The number of events imax is the maximum that one may see under the alternative
hypothesis at a fixed power 1 − β. In this sense, it is the number of events that we will
witness in the worst-case. However, we will typically reach a decision sooner. In Figure
2 we show the expected value of the random number of events τθ1 , and of its stopped
version τθ1 ∧ imax under the null hypothesis.
For comparison, we also show the number of events that one would need under the
Gaussian non-sequential approximation of Schoenfeld (1981) to achieve a power of 0.8
— i.e. one treats the log-rank statistic as if it were normally distributed, and, for fixed
number of events, one rejects the null using a z-testi, i.e. if the log rank statistic is larger
than z0.05 = 1.645. One then calculates power under the assumption that the log rank
statistic also has a normal distribution under the alternative as described underneath
(22); this is a standard classical approach. We see that imax is significantly larger than
the Schoenfeld’s predicted number of events, but the expected value of τθ1 ∧ imax, which
is the number we will need on average if we plan on stopping at imax at the latest, is of
comparable size. For small hazard ratios Schoenfeld’s Gaussian approximation deterio-
rates, and determining the sample size needed for achieving a power of 80% when using a
z-test as above is overly optimistic. To account for this, for small hazard ratios, in Figure
2, we computed by simulation the exact sample size needed to achieve power 80% when
using the z-test based on the log rank statistic, and for larger hazard ratios we used the
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Figure 2: Each panel is a different starting number of subjects in group 1, and the same
number of patients in group 0. In general, one is expected to stop earlier than the value imax
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5.1 Gaussian approximation
In Figure 3 we show the relation between the maximum number of events imax derived




Note that the Gaussian approximation of the Bernoulli likelihood is not expected to be
accurate for small values of θ1. We note that in the case when we start with 10000 patients
in both groups, it is necessary to have a maximum number of events ∼ 1000 for θ1 = 0.9
to retain 80% power. This is not regime where we conjecture that the “Gaussian” ap-
proximation to the Bernoulli likelihood process is valid. We performed experiments with
larger starting group sizes, where we witnessed the “Gaussian” approximation stopping
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defined in (21) (but not with fixed design). Each panel shows the result
of simulating using a different starting number of patients (100, 1000, and 10000), which is
equal in both groups. For small starting number of patients, it is not possible to have error
80% and stop before we run out of patients in the experiments.
5.2 Misspecification, and beta prior on Θ1
As we noted earlier, it may happen that data come from a distribution with a more
extreme hazard ratio than we anticipated. As we argued in Section 4.2, the best choice
(the one that leads to the smallest stopping time τθ1) is to use for our test martingaleMθ1,1
the value of θ1 that actually generates the data. This value is of course unknown in all
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practical situations. In Figure 4 we illustrate such a situation when we start with 1000 in
both groups. We generated data using different hazard ratios, and used a ‘misspecified’
Mmissθ1,1 that always used θ1 = 0.8. Note that while this is still the GROW (minimax
optimal) martingale test under H1 = {Pθ : θ1 ≤ 0.8}, if we knew the true θ1, we could
obtain a faster-growing test martingale. We estimated the maximum number of events
imissmax that allows for 80% power. We compare this to three other alternatives: first, the
maximum number of events imax that we would have obtained had we known real value
of θ, and the iBetamax that we obtain by using the Beta prior as described in Section 4.2 with





























































Beta Prior (m = 100)
Misspecified
Well−specified
Maximum number of events for 80% power
Figure 4: We show the number of events at which one can stop retaining 80% power using
the process Mθ1,0 with θ1 = 0.80 when the real hazard ratio was different. We used a starting
number of patients equal to 1000 in both groups. Using a Beta prior with parameter m = 5
can lead to earlier stopping when the real one hazard ratio is close to the real compared to
using a mispecified test. Larger values of m give a bahavior increasingly similar to using
the misspecified Mθ1,0. Placing a prior on Θ1 can lead to earlier stopping than using a
misspecified test in some situations.
6 Formal Proof that Mθ0,θ1 is a test martingale in con-
tinuous time
In this section we give a formal proof that the process Mθ0,θ1 presented in Section 2 is a
martingale in continuous time, and under noninformative right censoring. First we need
a battery of definitions, and preliminary results. Our main reference in this section is the
text of Fleming and Harrington (2011).
Let θ = λ(1)(t)/λ(0)(t) be the hazard ratio, which is assumed to be a constant in
time under the proportional hazards ratio model. We observe data for n participants.
For the j-th participant, we observe the triplet (Zj , Xj , δj), where each element is as
follows. Zj , Yj , Y
g are defined as before. We also observeXj = min{Cj , Tj}, the minimum
between the random censoring time Cj , and the time Tj when the event of interest
occurred. Thirdly, we observe the indicator δj of whether the event of interest occured
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(δj = 1 in that case), or not (δj = 0). Thus, the data for participants consists of n
independent triplets (Z1, X1, δ1), . . . , (Zn, Xn, δn).
We assume that the event times T1, . . . , Tn are absolutely continuous random vari-
ables that are iid conditionally on which group each participant belongs to, and that the
censoring times C1, . . . , Cn are iid with an arbitrary distribution independent of that of
the event times.
We now let Nj(t) = 1Xj≤t,δj=1, and N
C
j (t) = 1Xj≤t,δj=0 the processes that count
whether or not the event of interest or censoring already happened at time t for participant
j. Let Ft be the filtration generated by these two processes Ft = σ{Nj(s), NCj (s) : 0 ≤
s ≤ t}. Under these assumptions, Fleming and Harrington (2011, Theorem 1.3.1) show
that for each j = 1, . . . , n, the process t 7→ Nj(t) − λj(t) is a martingale adapted to the
filtration Ft, where λj(t) = Yj(t)λ(1)(t) if Zj = 1, and λj(t) = Yj(t)λ(0)(t) if Zj = 0.
We continue with a few more definitions. For j = 1, . . . , n, let qθ,j(t) be the likelihood
of randomly sampling a participant from the group Zj at odds θY




Y 0(t) + θY 1(t)
+ (1− Zj)
Y 0(t)
Y 0(t) + θY 1(t)
.
Let θ0 and θ1 be pair of hazard ratios under the null and under the alternative hypothesis,
respectively. Define rj(t) as the probability ratio between the probabilities qθ1,j(t) and







Y 0(t) + θ0Y
1(t)
Y 0(t) + θ1Y 1(t)
+ (1− Zj)
Y 0(t) + θ0Y
1(t)
Y 0(t) + θ1Y 1(t)
.
Let (T1, j1), . . . , (TK , jK) be the pairs of times Tk at which the event of interest in either
group are observed, and their corresponding patient index jk. Define the process M(t)





for t > 0, where we interpret the empty product as being equal to 1. We can rewrite this








where as before Ni(t) = 1Xi≤t, and the integration is performed pathwise.
With these definitions and preliminary results, we are in position to formulate the
main result of this section.
Theorem 5 The process t 7→M(t) defined in (23) is a martingale adapted to the filtra-
tion {Ft}t>0 given by Ft = σ{Nj(s), NCj (s) : i = 1, . . . , n, 0 ≤ s ≤ t}.






Hj(s)(dNj(s)−dλj(s)) for predictable processesH1(s), . . . ,Hn(s).






M(s−)(rj(s)− 1)(dNj(s)− λj(s)dt). (24)
The result will follow because for j = 1, . . . , n, the processes t 7→ M(s−)(rj(s) − 1)
are bounded, and since they are left continuous, they are predictable (see Fleming and
Harrington, 2011, Lemma 1.4.1).
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thus, comparing the previous display and our goal (24), it is sufficient to prove that∑
i
(ri(t)− 1)λi(t) = 0. (25)













Y 0(t) + θ1Y 1(t)
)
. (26)


























0(t)λ(0)(t). Using these last observations and the fact that under
the null hypothesis λ(1)(t)/λ(0)(t) = θ0, the previous display implies that (25) holds. This
implies that M(t) satisfies (24) and that consequently it is a martingale, as claimed. 2
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We introduced the safe logrank test, a version of the logrank test that can retain type-I
error guarantees under optional stopping and continuation. We gave an extension to Cox’
proportional hazards regression which seems very promising since it provides type-I error
guarantees even if the alternative model is equipped with arbitrary priors. In future work,
we plan to implement this extension — which requires the use of sophisticated methods
for estimating mixture models.
Earlier approaches to sequential time-to-event analysis were also studied under sce-
narios of staggered entry, where each patient has its own event time (e.g. time to death
since surgery), but patients do not enter the follow-up simultaneously (such that the risk
set of e.g. a two-day-after-surgery event changes when new participants enter and survive
two days). Sellke and Siegmund (1983) and Slud (1984) show that, in general, martingale
properties cannot be preserved under such staggered entry, but that asymptotic results
are hopeful (Sellke and Siegmund, 1983) as long as certain scenarios are excluded (Slud,
1984). When all participants’ risk is on the same (calendar) time scale (e.g. infection risk
in a pandemic), or new patients enter in large groups (allowing us to stratify — Exam-
ple 5), staggered entry poses no problem for our methods. But research is still ongoing
into those scenarios in which our inference is fully safe for patient time under staggered




H(s)dN(s) for a predictable process H and a counting process N , then for x 7→ F (x) a
continuous function it holds that dF (X(t)) = (F (X(t−) +H(t))− F (X(t−)))dN(t)
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Let (i, ~y, y0, y1) be compatible wit i event times. Then there exists a k ∈ N (in fact, there
exist infinitely many k) such that the following conditional probability is well-defined,
and we can derive:
P[ε],θ(N
1〈i〉 = 1 | ~Y〈i− 1〉 = ~y, t〈i〉 = k · ε) =
P[ε],θ(N
1〈i〉 = 1, N0〈i〉 = 0 | ~Y〈i− 1〉 = ~y, t〈i〉 = k · ε)+
P[ε],θ(N
1〈i〉 = 1, N0〈i〉 > 0 | ~Y〈i− 1〉 = ~y, t〈i〉 = k · ε) =
(1 + f(ε)) · P[ε],θ(N1〈i〉 = 1, N0〈i〉 = 0 | ~Y〈i− 1〉 = ~y, t〈i〉 = k · ε) (28)
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where f(ε) is given by
P[ε],θ(N
1〈i〉 = 1, N0〈i〉 > 0 | ~Y〈i− 1〉 = ~y, t〈i〉 = k · ε)




























(1 + o(ε)) = o′(ε) (29)
where t = kε, we abbreviated 1 − ελ(g)(t) to ρε,(g),t, and o and o′ are both ‘small o’
functions that go to 0 faster than ε (the limit implicit in o′(ε) holds because of the factor
εj in the numerator). Also, with the same abbrevations,
P[ε],θ(N






























· (1 + o′′′(ε)) (30)
where again t = kε and o′′ and o′′′ are two more ‘small o’ functions that go to 0 faster than
ε. We see that the limit does not depend on k, so that the first limit result of Theorem 1
follow for g = 1 in (28); the proof for g = 0 is entirely analogous. The second limit of
Theorem 1 follows by repeating exactly the same reasoning with the conditioning event
~Y 〈i− 1〉 = ~y replaced by Y 1〈i− 1〉 = y1, Y 0〈i− 1〉 = y0. Uniformity of the limits follows
directly by noting that the supremum is over a finite set.
B Proof of Theorem 2
We define the m-component binary vector
~NK := (N [K,K + ε], N [K + ε,K + 2ε], . . . , N [K + (m− 1)ε,K + 1])
which indicates at what ε-width time intervals between time K and K+1 events happened
in either group; the kth entry of this vector is the number of events that happened between
time K + (k − 1)ε and K + kε. Similarly, ~NgK is a defined as a vector whose kth entry
indicates the number of events in group g inbetween time K + (k − 1)ε and K + kε.
We now first determine, for binary m-component vectors ~s with s ≥ v ones, the
probability
P[ε],θ(N










After having found an expression for this conditional probability, we will argue that it
coincides, up to a (1 + o(ε)) factor, with the probability that we are after. We can write




~NK−1 = ~s) = a~w · a′~w,
where a~w, satisfying (32), collects all factors corresponding to intervals of length ε during
which nothing happens (i.e. the components of ~s with 0 entry), and a′~w, given by (33),














where λ̄g = supK≤t<K+1 λ(g)(t), λg = infK≤t<K+1 λ(g)(t), so that a~w = 1 + o(ε).
To get an expression for a′~w, first let, for u ∈ [s], `u be the index of the u-th component
in ~s that is 1. That is, if ~s = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, . . .) then `1 = 4, `2 = 6, and so on. ~NK−1 = ~s
thus means that a single event happened in intervals [(K − 1) + 3ε, (K − 1) + 4ε] and
[(K − 1) + 5ε, (K − 1) + 6ε], and so on. Let k1(~v), k2(~v), . . . , ks(~v) be defined such that
ku(~v) = 1 if v`u = 1 and ku(~v) = 0 otherwise. ku(~v) represents whether the u-th of
the s events inbetween time K − 1 and K was in group 1 or 0. Below we abbreviate

















u′≤u(1−ku′ (~w)) · (λ0,uε)1−ku(~w) = (1 + o(ε))p(~w),
(33)







ku′(~w)) · λku(~w)1,u · (y0 −
∑
0<u′<u










































Plugging this into (31), we get
P[ε],θ(N















































which only depends on the number of events s inbetween K = 1 and K and not on their
specific location in the vector ~s. We have thus shown that
P[ε],θ(N
1[K − 1,K] = v | N [K − 1,K] = s, EK) =
P[ε],θ(N


















where EK is the event (in our measure space) that not more than one event took place
in any interval between K − 1 and K. The result then follows by standard rewriting of
the above probability using that Pr(EK) = 1− o(ε), as can be shown in a way similar to
(29); we omit the details.
26
